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Supply chain disruptions did not cause the shortages of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and other essential goods that the world experienced in the 
early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather, the cause was manufacturers’ 
inability to step up production of PPEs to meet the demands of the crisis. The 
accepted wisdom that the pandemic exposed serious structural problems in 
international supply chains, such as an over-dependence on China, and that it 
would be better for countries to source supplies domestically, is inaccurate. 
The companies that produced PPEs and other essential goods were experienced 
when it came to developing risk-management strategies. Manufacturers have 
understood the risks related to international supply chain shocks at least since 
2008’s global recession and have long since responded by diversifying supplier 
bases, increasing manufacturing capacity and creating stockpiles. Many firms 
also relied on the China Plus One strategy as a buffer, which entailed duplicating 
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production in China and at least one other country to protect against supply chain 
disruption and currency fluctuation.
Far from exposing a weakness in global value chains, the pandemic instead revealed their 
resilience. So well did the face-mask industry rebound from its initial shortage in fact, 
that industry revenues grew by 450 per cent from 2019 to 2021. Rather, the shortages 
arose because of limited stockpiles, governments’ lack of preparedness and constrained 
production, such as the difficulty in accelerating the melt-blowing process that creates 
the masks’ non-woven fabric. Exacerbating the situation – but only temporarily – were 
export bans of the type the Trump administration imposed on manufacturers, which 
required them to obtain federal approval before exporting PPE. 
COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic the world experiences. Governments can prepare 
for the next one by establishing stress tests that assess a country’s ability to deal with 
demand spikes and other disruptions. The tests should consider the government’s level 
of stockpiling, the speed with which domestic and foreign production can be ramped 
up, the diversification of import sources and the limitations created by foreign export 
restrictions. If the market fails to pass these stress tests, then government must design 
policy tools to deal with the shortcomings the tests reveal. Limiting export restrictions 
to strengthen resilience, conducting joint procurement and drafting agreements to share 
essential goods are ways countries can work together to promote resilience. 
Self-sufficiency, which looked to be the solution in the early days of pandemic shortages, 
only increases vulnerability to local disasters that can curtail domestic production. It also 
creates higher production costs and reduces the ability to ramp up production. Self-
sufficiency forces countries to absorb the shocks themselves, resulting in large price 
swings and production changes. 
It is now up to governments to learn the hard lessons that COVID-19 taught and improve 
preparedness for future pandemics.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has once again put global value chains (GVCs) front and 
centre in policy debates. When shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE)1 
came to light in the first six months of 2020, several policy-makers and academics 
were quick to point fingers at structural flaws in cross-border supply chains, which 
they believed made the production of essential goods vulnerable to pandemic-related 
supply chain disruptions (Javorcik 2020). They asserted that GVCs have become 
too complex, that countries have become overly dependent on China and that GVCs 
were not designed to operate in today’s turbulent geopolitical landscape. Across 
government, academic and consultancy circles, calls were made to make supply chains 
more resilient by forcing manufacturing and supply networks to diversify and localize 
(Jones and Kapelos 2020; Lighthizer 2020).
The aim of this brief is to examine the evidence behind this narrative. While the 
COVID-19 pandemic caused GVC disruptions in early spring of 2020, I will show that 
these events cannot be generalized to argue that they exposed structural flaws in 
GVCs. In addition, I will point out that GVC disruptions were not the principal cause of 
the highly mediatized shortages in essential goods. Rather, the scarcity in PPEs and 
other essential products was triggered by firms’ inability to rapidly ramp up production 
to keep up with the astronomical spike in demand caused by the pandemic. I will 
nonetheless discuss several policy actions that the Canadian government can adopt to 
strengthen the resilience of its essential goods sector against future pandemics. 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS ARE REAL  
(AND MOSTLY MANAGEABLE)…
My point is not to downplay the existence of international supply chain risks. Whether 
it is a pandemic, a natural disaster or a policy intervention, production can suddenly 
stop in one country and induce a contagion effect to other countries through GVCs 
(Miroudot 2020). History has provided us with numerous examples. During the great 
recession of 2008-2009, negative liquidity shocks in one country caused a chain 
reaction of financial difficulties throughout GVCs as firms relied on each other for 
credit, aggravating the downturn-induced trade collapse (Bems et al. 2013). In the 
immediate aftermath of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, the production 
of many Japanese automotive and electronics components dried up, creating a 
disruption in international supply chains that affected the price and availability of cars 
and computers around the world (Escaith et al. 2011). The Chinese supply shock at 
the end of January and beginning of February 2020 led to similar knock-on effects. 
On February 14, for example, Fiat Chrysler announced that “it is temporarily halting 
production at a car factory in Serbia because it can’t get parts from China” (Foldy 
2020). Recently, the container vessel Ever Given’s six-day blockage of the Suez Canal 
created shipping delays that were expected to keep disrupting global supply chains 
for more than a month after the events (Dempsey 2021). Companies understand the 
risks related to international supply chain shocks and have developed sophisticated 
risk management strategies to deal with many of them. In the wake of the 2008-2009 
1 PPE includes respirators, surgical masks, hospital gloves and medical goggles.
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recession, countless firms have added agility to their supply chains by diversifying 
their supplier bases, increasing manufacturing capacity and creating buffer stocks 
(Simchi-Levi and Simchi-Levi 2020a). Well before the start of the 2018 Sino-U.S. trade 
war, for example, many companies had adopted a China Plus One strategy where 
they duplicated production in China and at least one other country to reduce their 
vulnerability to supply chain disruptions and currency fluctuations in any individual 
country (Symington 2013). 
These risk management strategies have strengthened the resilience of many firms’ 
supply chains by allowing their production “to return to its original state or move to 
a new, more desirable state after being disturbed” within a reasonable time frame 
(Christopher and Peck 2004). Indeed, a remarkable yet under-reported story of the 
COVID-19 pandemic is how little GVCs’ disruptions affected production despite the 
economic crisis’s suddenness, severity and global synchronicity. Confinement measures 
in the early months of the pandemic put an unprecedented halt to production across 
the globe and the unparalleled grounding of airline fleets put the global transport 
infrastructure in turmoil (Gagnnes and Van Assche 2020). Despite these hardships, 
while a majority of companies surveyed by McKinsey did encounter some problems 
in their production and distribution (Alicke et al. 2020), they were mostly temporary 
(Seifert and Markoff 2020). That is, the rapid adjustment of international supply chains 
to the once-in-a-lifetime economic turmoil principally exposed the resilience of most 
GVCs, not the existence of structural flaws (OECD 2021).
…BUT THEY WERE NOT AT THE SOURCE OF ESSENTIAL 
GOODS SHORTAGES
Several scholars and pundits have pointed to the shortages in N-95 masks in early 
2020 as a counter-example of GVCs gone too far, but recent studies find that 
this argument is on shaky grounds. The scarcity of N-95 masks was driven by an 
exceptional surge in global demand and not by disruptions on the supply side (Evenett 
2020; Gereffi 2020). Worldwide, face mask industry revenue grew from US$737 million 
in 2019 to US$22 billion in 2021, suggesting a compound annual growth rate of almost 
450 per cent (Research and Markets 2020). In the United States, the medical face mask 
market is projected to reach about US$7 billion in 2020, which is a year-on-year growth 
rate of 453 per cent (Arizton Advisory and Intelligence 2020). In Canada, demand for 
medical- and non-medical-grade masks will be 3.3 billion units in 2021 (Allam Advisory 
Group 2020).
Both local and global mask production increased rapidly to meet the demand surge, 
but limited stockpiles and constrained production capacity made it impossible to keep 
up with the explosion in mask consumption (Gereffi 2020). First, stockpiles in Canada 
and other countries were woefully low to deal with an airborne pandemic. As Health 
Minister Patty Hajdu said on April 1, 2020: “I think federal governments for decades 
have been underfunding things like public health preparedness, and I would say that 
obviously governments all across the world are in the same exact situation” (Leo 2020).
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Second, the main production chokehold in N-95 value chains was not international 
supply chain disruptions but rather the difficulty to ramp up the melt-blowing process 
that is needed to manufacture the non-woven fabric at the heart of the mask (OECD 
2020). This production bottleneck not only triggered mask shortages in countries like 
Canada which heavily depended on imports for their mask consumption, but in January 
and February 2020 it also instigated a plummeting of exports and a rise of imports 
in the world’s largest PPE exporter: China (Bown 2020a). In fact, once China got its 
pandemic under control, the country contributed to solving the North American mask 
shortage problem with massive exports to the region (Evenett 2020; Miroudot, 2020).
Several policy experts have suggested that early shortages were exacerbated by 
governmental export bans (Fiorini et al. 2020), and there is some truth to this. In March, 
for example, Germany required government approval for its firms to export protective 
equipment such as masks, goggles and gloves. In April, the Trump administration 
in a similar fashion prohibited PPE exports without prior approval from its Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In virtually all cases, however, foreign policy 
pressure and pushback quickly watered down these export restrictions, thus limiting 
their disruptive impact (Bown 2020b). PPE exports to Canada and Mexico, for example, 
were exempted from FEMA authorization (Leonard 2020). While export restrictions 
were a real nuisance that generated significant international tensions, they were not at 
the origin, nor were they the main instigator, of the mask shortages.
Gereffi (2020) nicely summarized the root cause of the N-95 mask fiasco by suggesting 
that it was mainly the result of policy failures, not GVC failures. The origin of the mask 
shortage was a lack of governmental preparedness that had limited the development 
of stockpiling strategies and contingency plans. For Gereffi, the key policy problem was 
how to ensure that supply can be ramped up during future demand spikes, not how to 
deal with supply chain disruptions.
BUILDING FUTURE PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS
How can governments ensure that the supply of essential health-care goods such as 
pharmaceuticals and equipment is nonetheless better prepared for future pandemics? 
Simchi-Levi and Simchi-Levi (2020b) have come up with an interesting proposal: similar 
to bank stress tests that were imposed after the 2008-2009 recession, governments 
should work together with industries that provide essential goods to establish stress 
tests that capture a country’s ability to deal with demand spikes or other disruptions. 
These stress tests should consider the government’s own stockpiling, the speed with 
which both local production and imports can be ramped up, the diversification of 
import sources and the impact of potential export restrictions by other countries. This 
would encourage both governments and businesses to collaborate on identifying what 
level of societal resilience is desirable and on designing the policy tools that can be 
implemented to attain it. In places where the market alone does not provide sufficient 
resilience, the government can introduce extra buffer stocks and additional supply 
diversification through targeted stockpiling and public procurement policies, among 
other things.
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Government authorities should treat international co-operation as an integral part 
of their strategy to develop resilience in the supply of essential goods (OECD 
2021). Bilateral or plurilateral agreements to share essential goods, to conduct joint 
procurements and to limit export restrictions can all strengthen resilience by both 
reducing a country’s vulnerability to disruptions and increasing its ability to bounce 
back post-disruption.
It is critical to point out that economic self-sufficiency is not the best way for Canada to 
build resilience. Yes, fully localized production reduces a country’s exposure to shocks 
that disrupt foreign production or trade (e.g., the Suez Canal blockage). But it also 
increases a country’s vulnerability to local disasters that curtail domestic production 
(e.g., the Texas power failure). In other words, building resilience implies that countries 
should avoid putting all their eggs in one basket, and GVCs can play an important 
role in guaranteeing this. Adding to this, economic self-reliance comes at significantly 
higher production costs and a reduced ability to ramp up production. The OECD 
(2020b) recently conducted a set of economic model simulations to capture the impact 
of production localization on OECD countries’ economic performance and vulnerability 
to idiosyncratic shocks. It found that production localization forces countries to 
shoulder more of the adjustments to absorb shocks themselves, translating into larger 
price swings and large changes in production, ultimately leading to greater variability 
of incomes. According to the study, welfare and real GDP in OECD countries would on 
average have contracted five per cent more if production had been more localized than 
it is today. Canada’s real GDP would thus have been affected particularly harshly, at 13 
per cent lower than it is today. 
CONCLUSION
My analysis suggests that the narrative about structural flaws in GVCs that has 
dominated policy discussions in the last year is shaky. The assertion that the pandemic 
has exposed serious structural problems in GVCs, which in turn are pushing companies 
to reconfigure their international supply chains, seems overblown. The notion that these 
same deficiencies were at the root of shortages in essential goods such as PPE is weak. 
And the idea that economic self-sufficiency must be strengthened to overcome these 
deficiencies has been shown to be unhelpful at best and dangerous at worst. 
There is a general understanding that governments need to do more to improve their 
countries’ preparedness for future pandemics, and the establishment of stress tests 
in essential goods industries is particularly interesting. Doing so in a resilient fashion 
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